Abstract. Non-discrimination norms in human rights instruments generally enumerate specified categories for protection, such as race, ethnicity, sex or religion, etc. They often omit express reference to sexual minorities. Through open-ended interpretation, however, sexual minorities subsequently become incorporated. That 'cumulative jurisprudence' yields protections for sexual minorities through norms governing privacy, employment, age of consent, or freedoms of speech and association. Hate speech bans, too, are often formulated with reference to traditionally recognised categories, particularly race and religion. It might be expected that the same cumulative jurisprudence should therefore be applied to include sexual minorities. In this chapter, that approach is challenged. Hate speech bans suffer from inherent flaws. They either promote discrimination by limiting the number of protected categories, or, by including all meritorious categories, would dramatically limit free speech. Sexual minorities within longstanding, stable and prosperous democracies should generally enjoy all human rights, but should not necessarily seek the protections of hate speech bans.
Introduction
On the evening of 13 September 2002, three boys, aged 16 -20 entered a city park in Reims, France. Their plan was to 'smash an Arab' ('casser de l'Arabe'). Instead they found François Chenu. Chenu was 29 years old, an openly gay man. So they decided to 'smash a faggot' ('cassé du pédé'). They taunted him, beat him, then threw him in a pond, where he was later discovered drowned. 2 Queer bashing is never just about physical assaults. A society casual about words like 'queer' or 'poof' is one in which sexual minorities 3 are maimed and murdered. Queer bashing without words is like a dirge without music. Queer bashing is that torrent of blows and words, every kick and punch chanted with 'queer', 'poof', 'faggot', 'cocksucker' or 'lesbo'; like a racist, anti-Semitic or Islamaphobic attack, the same kinds of words spewed with the same kinds of blows.
In recent years, that violence of words has provided powerful justifications for hate speech bans. 4 It is understandable that sexual minorities would seek protection under them as part of a broader effort to combat prejudice. In so doing, they would be pursuing an otherwise legitimate and often successful strategy, which I shall call 'cumulative jurisprudence'. Gains for sexual minorities have frequently resulted from activists, lawyers and scholars citing protections, such as privacy, free expression, free association, or nondiscrimination, which may not originally have been adopted with sexual minorities in mind, but then showing how those protections can and should be interpreted to include sexual minorities. In the following discussion, I shall argue that cumulative jurisprudence is appropriate for sexual minorities as a general matter, but should not be assumed to apply mechanically to all norms that may emerge within the human rights corpus, without any deeper enquiry into the legitimacy of the underlying norms themselves. Norms against hate speech provide an example.
I shall begin by examining the concept of cumulative jurisprudence as a systematic application of general human rights norms to categories of persons not expressly named or intended in leading human rights instruments. A cumulative jurisprudence has allowed sexual minorities to gain increasing recognition within human rights systems, and might seem prima facie to justify the extension of hate speech bans to include sexual minorities. I shall then argue, however, that hate speech bans pose a dilemma intolerable for human rights law: either they promote discrimination by unfairly limiting the protected categories and individuals; or, if they were to include all similarly-situated categories and individuals, they would represent more than just minimal limits on free speech. I conclude that sexual minorities should generally enjoy all guarantees available within human rights law, but should not seek refuge in bans that may serve more to betray fundamental principles of human rights law than to promote them.
Sexual Minorities and Cumulative Jurisprudence
Michel Foucault's publication of Histoire de la sexualité 5 in 1976 sparked a revolution in our understandings of dominant and subordinated social groups. Foucault described the postEnlightenment appropriation of sexuality within the sphere of scientific enquiry. Purportedly neutral, objectivist-professionalised and therefore exclusive-scientific discourses of sexuality, presupposing unacknowledged standards of normativity and deviance 6 , came to pervade language and consciousness to the extent that what we now know as 'heterosexuality', 'homosexuality', 'transsexualism', and a long train of similar terms came to construct, and thereby to control, our everyday sense of sexual experience and sexual identity. be construed to apply to sexual minorities if they are to avoid falling into internal contradiction. As a descriptive matter, it provides a sense of how, in general, advocacy for rights of sexual minorities has in fact tended to proceed: once the post-World War II frameworks for human rights were already firmly in place-originally drafted with little regard to rights for sexual minorities-sexual orientation and identity have subsequently been incorporated at international, regional and national levels, be it through national legislation and adjudication, or through the judgments or opinions of international or regional human rights bodies.
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In its prescriptive role, the Principle of Extant Rights takes as axiomatic-that is, it merely assumes, insofar as international human rights count as norms within positive international, regional or national law-that existing rights within the international corpus are normatively legitimate, in particular such fundamental norms as privacy, expression, association or non-discrimination. In proposing it, I conceded from the outset that human rights may not be historically or cross-culturally universal. They may be artefacts of specific historical, political and economic circumstances. Or, even if we take as given a general corpus of human rights, certain rights within that corpus might be challenged in their formulation or interpretation. 25 Many a human rights norm-such as privacy, expression, association, non-discrimination-could be independently contested on its own terms, before any more specific inquiry into its applicability to sexual minorities would even arise. Is the norm genuinely universal? Does it, in all cases, stand as a legitimate "trump" over worthy, competing interests?
The prescriptive approach, then, simply assumes the validity of the general corpus of fundamental human rights, without undertaking any inquiry into the overall validity either of any specific right, or of the human rights corpus, as such. Its role is merely to state that, insofar as the existing corpus is accepted and applied, it must be applied equally to sexual minorities. For nuts-and-bolts human rights practice, that assumption poses few problems. , until finally settling upon a standard of intermediary review ('heightened', but not always 'strict'), which-often in the interest of respecting gender differences that would accrue to women's advantage-had to take into account complexities of difference that tend to be specific to gender.
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The road for sexual minorities was at least as rocky. 62 In the words of the COM-COE resolution, such a film can 'reasonably be understood' to be 'spreading or promoting' discriminatory attitudes.
In 1999, the England Football Association manager Glenn Hoddle publicly stated that individual disabilities were justly deserved, through 'bad karma' accumulated in former lives.
Hoddle lost his job thereafter 63 , but only as a matter of public relations, due to his high profile, and not through the application of any hate speech ban. Even in the rare cases where physical, mental or psychological disability has been contemplated for inclusion under hate speech bans 64 , no serious attempt has been made to explain how that inclusion could occur without either massive, or wholly random, censorship of speech. Either whole categories such as physical, mental or psychological disability, age, or overweight, must be excluded; or, if they are included, essentially random, and therefore individually discriminatory, choices must be made about which members of those groups will and will not be protected from terms so ubiquitously used.
A cardinal aim of hate speech bans is to protect groups or individuals with scant political influence. While ethnic or religious minorities in several Western countries have organised visible political movements, the disabled are often isolated; limited in their ability even to associate effectively, let alone to mobilize strategic lobbying efforts. They are often restricted in their ability to earn, let alone to pool resources, and can generally direct few of their resources towards activities like anti-hate speech campaigns, given the ongoing and more pressing expenses of primary care. 65 66 The problem arises not from the prospect of offence caused to a Bush or a Quayle. Rather, the problem is that such terms offend all persons whose psychological conditions are thereby degraded. 67 That shift in focus-from the disparagement of a classification targeted against someone belonging to that classification, to its use against someone not belonging to it-requires some explanation, as it may appear to change considerably the nature of the hate speech concerned.
As James Weinstein, for example, has commented on a previous statement of my views, It is very rare nowadays that anyone, at least in the US or UK, would use a term to knowingly disparage the mentally retarded or physically handicapped. Nor is there a massive amount of hate speech readily available on the internet against the mentally retarded or the physically disabled, as there is with respect to blacks, Jews and gays.
There is not nearly the same reason to try to use the force of law to eradicate "hate speech" against these groups. People nowadays simply do not hate the mentally retarded or physically disabled in the way that too many people hate blacks, Jews, or gays. I think the same is true of the elderly. There may be more hostility towards this group, but nothing like that directed towards people on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion.
Moreover and more significantly, though there may be cases of people using "fighting words" against the elderly, the disabled, or the obese in the street when the get annoyed, there is to my knowledge no hate literature against these groups at all, and even if there is some, it is nothing like the virulent tracts directed against Jews, blacks and sexual minorities.
68
Weinstein's objection is empirical. There is no evidence of widespread hostility towards the mentally or physically disabled, elderly, or obese, comparable to that against certain racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual categories. Therefore, by definition, there can be no substantial causal link between derogatory language against those groups and any such hostility.
If that objection were correct, however, governments, courts and human rights bodies hate speech demonstrably causes detriment to the disparaged groups, as no such evidence has been adduced for longstanding, stable and prosperous democracies 72 , no more than it has been shown that violent films promote social violence, or that pornography augments incidents of rape. Rather, advocates of hate speech bans proceed on the broader assumption that hate speech might plausibly cause such detriment, indeed in ways which are often subtle and pernicious, and therefore not amenable to precise empirical observation.
Nor can it be argued that Blacks, Jews or sexual minorities have more burdened histories.
Nazism showed how the physically or mentally disabled, along with all the propaganda-hate speech-concerning their threats to Aryan purity and perfectability, led them to extermination on grounds of their putative sub-humanity. they seek protection. 74 Indeed, so common is the use of terms degrading to members of these groups that proponents of bans on racial and ethnic hate speech unwittingly use these terms.
For instance, Richard Delgado, a leading Critical Race Theorist and passionate advocate of penalties for racist speech, has used the word 'schizophrenic' derisively to mean 'inept'
, As
Delgado states elsewhere, 'we are our current stock of narratives, and they us.'
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It might be argued that, in view of increasing numbers of vocal elderly and overweight, they are now able to defend themselves in the public arena. However, the relative political stature of an otherwise numerical minority has not generally been deemed by advocates of hate speech bans to constitute grounds for excluding the affected members from protection.
Again, in Otto-Preminger-Institut, the fact that Roman Catholicism has long been Austria's overwhelmingly dominant faith, far from preventing censorship, was cited by Austrian authorities, unchallenged by the European Court, to suggest that there was ipso facto 'a pressing need for the preservation of religious peace'. 
Some Objections and Replies
Hate speech bans may be required as temporary measures within weak or newly emerging would be ridiculous' is, then, precisely the problem. Any serious step towards nondiscriminatory application of hate speech bans, even in cases of overall parity in the level of offence to the targeted group or individual ('easy cases'), would indeed be a step towards a 'ridiculously' censorious regime, whereby much freedom of speech would be exercised not as a right, but as a contingent government concession. Yet any step away from that order of censorship becomes a step towards discriminating between protected and unprotected victims of speech acts that are otherwise equally offensive.
One might also raise a more pragmatic objection. Consider the following argument:
'Perhaps terms like "idiot" or "old bag" are indeed difficult to eradicate. However, the fact that we cannot protect all individuals does not mean we should protect none. We don't live in an ideal world. We must achieve what we can, even if we can't achieve everything.' That objection might carry some weight in many other areas of law (it may be legitimate to renovate Hyde Park even if there is not enough money to clean up St James Park, or to catch more speeding motorists on the M1 than on the M4), but raises grave concerns for human rights. By analogy, there is no doctrine of human rights law which states that torture of some is justified as long as torture of most can be prevented; or that privacy, or freedom of conscience, are justified for some, even if they cannot be extended to all (such results may often occur in practice, for reasons of material constraint or political will, but are never justified by any principle of human rights law). Everyday legislation on ordinary issues must certainly deal in horse-trading and compromises, which presumably underlies much routine legislative activity: 'We'll agree to reduce taxes on the wealthy if you agree to reduce them on the poor'; 'We'll agree to raise the speed limit if you agree to build safety ramps'. That to distinguish between, on the one hand, a broader arena of public discourse-the arena of radio, television, film, the press, or the speaker in the public common-and, on the other hand, invective specifically and immediately directed by certain individuals against other, more-or-less specifically targeted individuals in face-to-face situations. 85 Opponents of hate speech bans rarely deny that offensive speech of the second type may legitimately be proscribed. In the United States, the doctrine of 'fighting words' allows the punishment of personally targeted insults in live, hostile encounters.. 86 In principle, the protections afforded by that traditional doctrine are far broader than those afforded by modern hate speech ban; they allow punishment of any kind of strongly offensive remark, which may include, yet need not be limited to, insults on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion or other such identity.
Certainly, traditional bans on 'fighting words' require periodic review as to their content or application, in view of changing social conditions. However, in itself, an approach like the US Supreme Court's upholding of bans on fighting words contains all that is required to protect all individuals from direct and unduly hostile verbal assaults. Moreover, as to actual crimes, involving non-speech acts such as killing, battery, theft, rape or vandalism, the US Supreme Court has found that no violation of free speech arises when hate speech is used as evidence of a hate-based criminal motive, or that crimes motivated by racial or other groupbased animus may be punished more harshly than others. 87 some sufficiently stable, longstanding and prosperous democracy is presupposed by any binding civil rights instrument, as suggested (1) by the inclusion, in modern instruments, of derogations clauses, authorizing suspension of certain rights during legitimately declared states of emergency 88 , as well as (2) the judicial application of derogation principles to older instruments 89 . Derogation principles effectively require that a state guarantee rights unless it is rendered materially unable to do so. 90 Certainly, many states, in Europe and internationally, albeit not fully stable, longstanding and prosperous democracies, are parties to the ICCPR or the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), without regularly invoking the derogations clauses. However, as to weaker or emerging democracies, the totality of their political, social and economic standards would warrant them to invoke those clauses against political or social unrest with far greater latitude (both under the ICCPR 'proportionality' principle and under the ECHR 'margin of appreciation' doctrine) than would be expected for the wealthier and more stable Western European members. 91 It is stable, longstanding and prosperous democracies that I have had in mind in noting that no correlation has been shown between levels of hate speech and incidence of hate crime.
However, it is by no means certain that such correlation is absent today in weaker or newly emerging democracies. In some emerging democracies, for example, is has been suggested that a newly liberalised press can harshly impact vulnerable groups without the democratic institutions or traditions, or the sheer resources, required to redress the effects. 92 Meanwhile, in such societies, attitudes towards sexual minorities have often remained harsh and have even worsened. 93 Accordingly, I have refrained from taking a position on hate speech in such societies. Bans may indeed be required where some likely causation from hate speech to hate crime can be shown. Overall, however, the growing strength of democratic institutions and practices, along with the resources to protect vulnerable groups, should be displayed in a society's gradual ability to reduce its reliance on hate speech bans.
Today, as opposed to just a few decades ago, the increasing disdain for persons who casually drop epithets like 'nigger', 'dirty Jew' or 'queer' gives testimony not so much to the efficacy of prosecutions, which have scarcely had any systematic character in Europe, but to the fact that, in essentially open, liberal democracies, maintaining faith in the free and robust exchange of ideas 94 , informal, social pressures have always had the potential to effectuate needed change without the need for coercive laws which, at best, accomplish nothing, and, at worst operate in unjustifiably discriminatory ways. In general, sexual minorities have been right to follow a cumulative jurisprudence-to insist that norms of even-handedness intrinsic to the very idea of human rights be rigorously implemented and respected in practice.
However, cumulative jurisprudence is only as worthy as the norms to which it is applied.
Hate speech bans, despite their wide acceptance within international law and in most national jurisdictions, raise grave concerns about both their conceptual and practical compatibility with the norms and principles of human rights law.
Conclusion
A cumulative jurisprudence of human rights has been and remains an important means of advancing the interests of sexual minorities within the dominant contemporary framework of international, regional and national human rights regimes. Even non-discrimination norms not originally conceived to apply to sexual minorities have been interpreted to extend to them with little conceptual or practical difficulty. That does not mean, however, that it should be applied willy-nilly to any norm that may emerge within human rights regimes. Hate speech bans are by definition conceived as limitations on fundamental rights of speech and expression. They cannot be applied in a non-discriminatory way without raising serious questions about the fundamental status of free speech. Again, any step away from discriminatory application becomes a step towards massive censorship; and any step away from massive censorship becomes a step towards discriminatory application. Either hate speech bans must arbitrarily exclude persons who are just as vulnerable as those who enjoy protection, or the bans must extend so far as to undermine the right of free speech and expression. Hate speech bans have no place within longstanding, stable and prosperous democracies, which have ample means at their disposal to protect sexual minorities and other vulnerable groups from hate crime and discrimination, without having to impose inevitably arbitrary limits on speech. 94 For a classic judicial statement, see, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring).
